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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 18080

v.
CHARLES L. CRICK,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against Defendant/Appellant Charles L. Crick and others, alleging
that said defendants did not unlawfully cause the death of another
in violation of Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, §76-5-203,
second degree murder, a felony of the first degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant/Appellant was found guilty of the charge after
a trial by jury and was sentenced by the court to be confined in
the Utah State Prison for the indefinite period of five years to
life.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed based
on the prejudicially erroneous failure of the trial court to give
the properly requested jury instructions on the lesser included
offense of MANSLAUGHTER, §76-5-205 U.C.A.
entered for

(1953}, or judgment

manslaughter~

STATEMENT. OF THE. FACTS
Appellant was charged with murder in the second degree
for the death on March 15, 1981, of Samuel Taylor Beare, IV.

His

case was joined with that of Mary V. Holloway due to a concurrence
of witnesses and the criminal episode.

However, the action was

not joined with that of Thomas Garcia.
A jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, from September 28, 1981, to
October 1,

1981~

the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.

At trial,

conflicting evidence was heard concerning the culpability of codefendants and Mr . . Garcia ..,

Most testimony agreed that Mr. Garcia

was chiefly responsible for the events of March 15th.
Due to the various evidence and circumstances that mitigated Appellant-s culpability, counsel for Appellant submitted a
proposed instruction on manslaughter (R-110)

~

Upon rejection of

this instruction, counsel made a timely objection

(R-484}~

Where-

upon the court submitted instead Instruction No. 27 to the jury (R-92),
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

directing that the verdict must be either guilty of criminal homicide,
murder, second degree; or not guilty.

No instruction was given as

to any possible lesser included offense.

After deliberating over

eleven hours, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty (R-52).
ARGUMENT
FAILURE TO GIVE THE PROPERLY REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER WAS PREJUDICIALLY
ERRONEOUS.
Appellant urges that the present case is one in which the
trial judge was bound by law to present to the jury the requested
instructions~

In short, Appellant contends that manslaughter is

a lesser included offense of murder in the -second degree, that the
lower court was obligated to charge the jury on said included
offense, and that the courtws faulure to present the theory through
an instruction to the jury, with timely objection, is reversible
error.
Appellant's first point, that manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of murder in the second degree seems incontrovertible. "The term vhornicide' is generic and embraces every mode by
which the life of one person is taken by another."

40 Am. Jur ..

Homicide §1.
Beside this statement of the common law, Defendant's claim
has been established by the courts and laws of the State of Utah.
See, e~g~ Farrow v. Smith, 541 P 2d~ 1107, 1108(0tah 1975) citing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Clown Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W~ 2d 625 1960 stating:
11

where the defendant was charged with
murder in the second degree but convicted of manslaughter, the conviction was proper, and the crime
of manslaughter was an included offense."
"'

••

See· State v. Williams, 6 36 P. 2d 109 2, 1097 (Utah 19 81) ,
citing State v. Gandee, 587 P. 2d 1064 (Utah 1978), where in discussing why carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle was not a lesser
offense of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon the court distinguished those crimes from the major crime of homicide, "with the
various lesser degrees thereof."
The present statute defining murder in the second degree
provides:
"Murder in the second degree.--(!)
Criminal
hornicide·constitues murder in the second degree if
the actor:
"(a)
Intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another; or
"(b)
Intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of another; or

"(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a
deoraved indifference to human life, he recklesslv
engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death of another and thereby causes the death of
another; or
~

~

(d) While in the com.mission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the commission
or attempted commission of aggravated robberv,
robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated ar~on, a~son, aggravated burgliiry,
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping,
causes the death of another person other than a
party,"
11

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"(2)
Murder in the second degree is a felony
of the first degree."
Section 76-5-203 U.C.A.
While

(1953), as amended.

the statute defining manslaughter provides:

"76-5-205. Manslaughter.--(1) Criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
"(a)

Recklessly causes the death of another;

or
"(b)
Causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse;
"(c)
Causes the death of another under circumstances where the actor reasonably believes the
circumstances prov.ide a moral or legal justification or extenuation for his conduct although the
conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.
"(2)
degree."

Manslaughter is a felony of the second

The distinction between the degrees of homicide is
the degree of

malice~

"For many years the definition of second
degree murder has been the unlawful killing of
a human being with malice aforethought and that
of mansalughter was the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice.
In our opinion the
new criminal code .has not changed those definitions,,," Farrow v .. Smith, supra, 1109, interpreting the above statutes as set forth in the 1975
Pocket Supplementn
Given the above statutory definitions and judicial interpretations, Appellant's next point, that the court was obligated to
give the

requested manslaughter instruction, is found in the same

statute that defines "lesser included offense . "
-5-
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Section 76-1-402(3), U.C.A., provides:
''(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and
the included offense. An offense is so included
when:

"(a)
It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
"(b)
It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
"(c)
It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense."
Section 76-1-402(4) states:
"(4) The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included
offense."
A proper reading of the above section is that if there is
a rational basis for the lesser included offense, then it is mandatory that the court charge the jury thereon.
Appellant pleaded and submitted sufficient evidence to
justify submission of the manslaughter instruction to the jury.

This

court may now "survey the evidence and inferences which admit of
rational deduction, to determine if there exists reasonable basis
upon which a conviction of the lesser offense could rest."
~ugher~x_,

u.c.A.,

State v.

550 P.n 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976), interpreting §77-33-6,

1953, as amended, a precursor to §76-1-402.

-6-

See also state
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v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d 811 (1970).
In addition to Appellant's own testimony, the record is
replete with evidence that could arguably exculpate or at least
reduce his

culpability~

For example, there is the testimony of co-

defendant Holloway (beginning R-422); the fact that

hcsti..]e~

witnesses

were friends of Tommy Garcia with bias (R-350); the fact that Tommy
Garcia was covered with blood while Appellant was not (R-350; R-410;
Exhibits D-43; D-44; D-45): the fact of diminished capacity through
possible methadone usage or intoxication (R-429).

(See People

v~

Mosher, 461 P. 2d 659, 82 Cal Rptr 379, 461 ?. 2d 659 (1969); People
v~

Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 49 Cal. Rptr

81~,

411 P. 2d 911 (1966).

There is also provocation in a racial slur (R-431) ; a fight in which
Appellant was not originally involved but may have eventually
participated in to protect his home or in self-defense, coupled with
the victim's own bad acts (R-315; R-425,

R-431)~

Finally, there

is the expert medical testimony that the cause of death was multiple.
stab wounds (R-388)· possibly inflicted by someone in a rage (R-394).
Appellant had no particular reason to be in a "rage" and testified
he did not hit or stab the victim (R-461).
Any of the above is sufficient to create a reasonable basis
upon which a conviction for a lesser offense could
totality, their effect is hardly nugatory11

rest~

Taken as a

Admittedly a gruesome

killing had occurred, but such killing was not conclusively established by the prosecution to be the result of Appellant's acts sufficient to convict on the greater offense.

-7-

In determining the degree
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of homicide Appellant was guilty of, the jury may consider not only
the nature of the killing, but also the personal turpitude of ·the
defendant.
In this case the jury was effectively precluded from
considering Appellant's malice by the faulty omission of a manslaughter instruction.

The jury could reasonably have concluded

that Appellant acted within the parameters of any of the three
statutory definitions of manslaughter.

Section 76-5-205, U.C.A,

supra.
When the lower court presumably chose not to believe
Defendant's testimony or that evidence favorable to him, it overs~epped

its bounds.

Questions of fact are for the jury.

"It is

the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts
in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the State is
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted."
Appellant would have been merely reckless in joining the
pre-existing affray and causing injury; he could have been extremely
disturbed by the events occurring in his home, either the fight
going on or by finding the victim putting the "make" on his cotenant (R-349).
Interestingly, there is some substantiation in the record
that the lower court may have felt that Appellant acted ''recklessly"
See Instruction 11,

(R-76), in which the definition of "recklessly"

was left in by the court.
-8-
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The fact that some of the evidence is testimony by rlppellant
himself does not per se destroy its credibility.

See State of Utah v.

Larry Elliott & Harrison Clayton, Nos. 17350, 17351, 17358 {Utah
January 21, 1982), fn 14, in which the defendant's own testimony was
used by the court to reverse a lower court conviction in which the
Jury did not receive lesser included offense instructions.

When such

evidence is received it has the same status as any other evidence, it
is to be considered by the jury, it is their prerogative to give it
any credibility they believe it entitled to.

Their prerogative, in

this case, was usurped through lack of proper instruction.
In interpreting the above information to detennine if there
was sufficient evidence to reduce the offense, it should be viewed
in the light most favorable to Appellant.

This court has declared:

"If there be any evidence, however slight,
on any reasonable theory of the case, under which
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included
offense, the trial court must, if requested, give
an appropriate instruction." State v. Chestnut,
621 P. 2d 1228, 1232 {Utah 1980) (Emphasis is
original)
See also, Elliott, supra
It cannot be said that the above evidence is so inherently
incredible as to preclude presentation of appellant's alternate
theories or instructions on the lesser included offense to the Jury.
The length of time the jury was out alone leaves some doubt as to how
well the elements of the greater offense were established.

But given

only the choice between the greater offense and acquittal, perhaps the

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jury chose, erroneously, the lesser of two evils.
Nor can it be said that the grisly character of the death
impedes a determination of manslaughter~

Not only was Appellant

probably not the perpetrator of the grosser acts, but in a similar
case this court held that even after a pathologist had testified
that the most serious wounds to the deceased were most likely caused
by the weapon used by defendant on the chest cavity, the jury might
have implied no intent to kill.
(Utah 1976).

State v. Gaxioca, 550 P.2d 1298

Surely it is not any more unreasonable to instruct a

jury that similar wounds allegedly made by a defendant were inflicted
under circumstances tantamount to manslaughter.
The Supreme Courts of both Utah and the United States
have declared as a matter of policy and procedural safeguard the
right of defendant to receive instructions on a lesser offense if
such is supported by evidence or if there is some doubt as to
elements of the greater offense.
"In passing this point we desire to say that
a trial court should, in every case where there
is any direct or inferential evidence with respect
to the different degrees of murder, charge the jury
with regard to all the degrees, and this rule should
be followed where there may be any doubt with regard
to whether the higher degree is established or not.
This is contemplated by our statute which divides
crimes into degrees and which requires the jury to
find in the lesser degree in case of doubt."
State v. Mewhinney, 42 Utah 498, 134 P. 632, 639.

-10-
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"While we have never held that a defendant
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process, the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and
federal courts establishes the value to the
defendant of this procedural safeguard. That
safeguard would seem to be especially important
in a case such as this.. For when the evidence
unquestionably establishes that the defendant
is guilty of a serious, violent offense -- but
leaves some doubt with respect to an element
that would justify conviction of a capital
offense -- the failure to give the jury the
'third option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance
the risk of an unwarranted conviction." Beck v.
----Alabama, 447 U.S~ 675, 637 (1980).
While this is not a capital case, neither does Appellant rely solely
on public policy, but also on case law and Utah statutes, supra.
Finally, it should be noted that Appellant's requested
instructions and objections to the charge were timely, as required
by Rule 19, Ut.

R~

Crim. Pro.

(R-110; & beginning at R-478).

Cf.

Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
The result of the failure of the trial court to give the
proper instruction is

reversal~

"The defendant in a criminal action has a
right to a full statement of the law from the
court; and a neglect to give such a full statement, where the jury consequently falls into
error, is sufficient ground for reversal ....
75 Am. Jur~ 2d, Trial §617.
Since the evidence adduced at trial established a rational
basis for a verdict of the lesser included offense of manslaughter,
this court should reverse the conviction.

-11-

See Elliott,
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supra~

CONCLUSION
Appellant presented sufficient evidence at trial to
warrant presentation of his theories to the jury.

This court

should determine that failure to give the requestee instruction
resulted in a reversible error.

Respectfully submitted this .2t(.7Jl,,.day of March, 1982.

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIF'ICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that on the g~~day of March, 1982, two
copies of the foregoing were placed for delivery by messenger to
the Office of the Attorney General of Utah, State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
j
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